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The Asymmetry of ‘Creation’ and ‘Origination’: 
Contrasts within Comparative Theology  
Daniel P. Sheridan 
Saint Joseph’s College of Maine 
 
I. Semantic Specificity and Theological 
Confusion 
THE following essay is a contribution to 
comparative theology, particularly in its 
contrastive dimension. For a successful 
comparative theology, the two theologies or 
religious perspectives being compared and 
contrasted must be described accurately and 
equally in depth. Where Christian theology in 
its Catholic dimension is one pole of the 
comparison, it is important to make a 
distinction between doctrine and theology 
which I will do below. Issues of translation also 
immediately arise.  
Recently I re-read two articles I wrote in 
1994 and in 1997 for the Journal of Vaishnava 
Studies, “Śrīdhara and His Commentary on the 
Bhāgavata Purāṇa” and “Madhva, the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa, and His Commentary on Its First 
Chapter.”1 In them, I translated the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa’s opening line according to each 
commentator.  The Bhāgavata Purāṇa’s first line 
has a clear reference to the second sutra of 
Bādarāyana’s Brahma Sūtras, i.e. janmādyasya 
yatah. 
Śrīdhara: “‘Him from whom is the creation, 
etc. of this [universe],’ inferred by positive 
and negative concomitance in things; all-
knower, self-luminous; who revealed the 
Vedas through the heart to the first sage; 
about whom the gods are confused; in 
whom the threefold evolution is real as is 
the transformation of fire, water, earth; by 
his own strength, always free from 
deception; the True, the Supreme, [on him] 
we meditate.”2 
 
Madhva: “‘Him from whom is the creation, 
etc. of this [universe],’ on account of 
harmonization and the other [logical 
reasoning about the senses of scripture], 
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all-knower, self-ruling; who revealed the 
Vedas through the heart to the first sage; 
about whom the sages are confused; in 
whom the threefold evolution is 
[apparently] false as is the transformation 
of fire, water, earth; by his own strength 
always free from deception; the True, the 
Supreme, [on him] we meditate.”3 
 
The Sanskrit word I translated here as 
“creation” is janma. Francis Clooney had 
translated janma differently in a related passage 
from the much earlier Brahma Sūtras of 
Bādarāyana [fifth century BCE ?] which the 
Bhāgavata Purāṇa [eighth century CE ?] was 
citing: 
 
Next, therefore, the desire to know 
Brahman. 
‘Brahman’ indicates that whence derive the 
origination, etc. of this world. 
Brahman is knowable because it is the 
source of the teachings. 
It is known from the Upanishads because it 
is their consistent object. 
 
A quick survey of different translators at 
hand revealed the following: janma as 
“creation” (Sheridan; Pereira; Raghunathan; 
Sanyal, Sharma); janma as “origination” or 
“origin” (Dasgpta; Clooney [1993], 
Vireswarananda; Panikkar; Apte; Thibaut); 
janma as “source” (Radhakrishnan); janma as 
“birth” (Gambirananda; Clooney [2001]). Thus 
this somewhat random selection shows a 
general divide between those preferring a 
translation of janma as “creation” with a 
significant, almost unavoidable, 
theological/Christian denotation and 
connotation and those who translate it with a 
significantly less theological term. In view of 
the ongoing work of comparative theology in 
which translation is always a major issue, is 
“creation” an appropriate translation of janma 
in connection with Bādarāyana and citations of 
this verse in later works like the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa? And what considerations are involved 
in answering this question of translation? 
I am exploring a very difficult area of 
comparative theology, that is, the area of how, 
and how well, we form categories and concepts 
suitable for inter-religious subjects that we 
study and about which we reason. This may be 
based on how we translate specific words from 
one religious tradition to another. Dilemmas of 
category formation and conceptual taxonomy 
arise when concepts that have specific 
theological definitions in one religious 
tradition, while also accompanied by a broad 
semantic range within that religious tradition, 
are used to translate concepts in another 
religious tradition, which may have a different 
semantic range.4 
For example, in the interaction between 
the Christian religious traditions and Hindu 
religious traditions over the past five centuries, 
we can discern several different types of uses of 
theological terms taken from Christian faith (in 
English) and then used within the religious 
traditions of Hinduism (in English). In the case 
of the theological concept of God, (1) “God,” in 
its Christian theological usage as “supreme 
being,” is used in a homologous function within 
some of the traditions of Hinduism; thus the 
conceptualization of God is thought to be close 
to the conceptualization of Brahman. Witness 
Clooney’s book Hindu God, Christian God.5 (2) 
“God” can be used to translate a term in 
Sanskrit with a specific definition within 
Hinduism, “Brahman,” even though “Brahman” 
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has its own broad and very different semantic 
range among the religious traditions of 
Hinduism. (3) “God” and/or “Brahman” can 
become inter-religious, or comparative 
theological, categories that postulate a putative 
identical reality that is called “God” in 
Christian theology and “Brahman” in Hindu 
theology. In Clooney’s perspective, this last sets 
up not a mistake in judgment but a dual process 
of reading and reasoning through the claims of 
the two religious traditions. In my judgment, 
however, we must be clear that the existence of 
an equivalent reality across the two traditions 
should be a conclusion, not a premise, in either 
theology. 
My concern about translating janma as 
“creation” also raises the questions whether 
these three types of uses are legitimate, and 
then whether they are theologically useful for 
either Christian theology or Hindu theology. I 
think that the term “theology” can itself be 
used in these three ways. However, to judge the 
legitimacy of these uses we must, following 
Clooney, read the texts from the two traditions 
and then reason across the two traditions. Of 
course, this is very much the work of a 
comparative theology that relies on 
appropriate and accurate translations. A 
penultimate investigation is appropriate about 
the use, misuse, and abuse of Christian 
theological terms like “God” and “creation” 
when translating Sanskrit terms.  
For historical, cultural, and theological 
reasons, contemporary studies of the 
intellectual traditions of Hinduism are often 
published in English. Thus terms and categories 
borrowed from Christian theology, sometimes 
from Protestant contexts, are often used in 
their English forms. In the words of Parimal G. 
Patil, 
 
There are significant asymmetries in the 
project of ‘comparative theology’ that 
reflect and reveal the complex historical, 
intellectual, and political realities of 
Christianity’s encounter with ‘others’ .  .  . 
It is not possible, in my opinion, to 
accurately describe Hindu arguments and 
theories in English without a deep 
familiarity with philosophical and Christian 
writing in English. Thus, any discussion of 
Hindu material that is authentic to the 
tradition and intelligible to contemporary 
theologians will already have to be 
comparative and dialogically responsible to 
Christian traditions of theology .  .  . As 
theologians from other traditions are 
allowed to contribute to the conceptual 
resources of the discipline, the vocabulary 
and style of English language theology 
should . . . become properly interreligious.6 
 
Patel may be too sanguine about the coherence 
of our English theological vocabulary, not yet 
“properly interreligious.” 
For forty-three years I have been 
translating Sanskrit texts. I often found myself 
flipping through Sanskrit-English dictionaries 
looking for English words that might match 
Sanskrit words. It took me a while to realize 
that the dictionaries depended on Oxbridge 
study of Latin and Greek, the Authorized 
Version, the Book of Common Prayer, 
Shakespeare, etc. The dictionaries were 
unfamiliar with philosophical and theological 
vocabularies from the Latin Christian tradition, 
and were certainly unfamiliar with the Greek 
and Oriental Christian traditions. To know 
something definite in comparative theology, 
we need a “properly interreligious” English 
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theological vocabulary that is appropriate both 
to the Christian traditions and to the Hindu 
traditions. This is precisely the challenge of an 
optimal comparative theology: how to be 
dialogically responsible. This responsibility 
certainly presumes something that is still 
rather rare, that is, an informed, professional, 
and competent understanding of, and across, 
two differing religious traditions.  
 
II. Reasoning about ‘Creation Out of Nothing’ 
Only, perhaps at the time of the Council of 
Nicaea in 325 CE in regard to definitive 
Christian doctrine, and then in the subsequent 
theological writings of figures like Saint 
Athanasius [c.296-373 CE], Saint Augustine 
[354-439 CE], and later Saint Thomas Aquinas 
[c.1225-1274 CE], did the defining contours of 
Christian monotheism become clear in the 
formulated doctrine.7 As a premise for the 
Trinitarian affirmation of the salvific role of the 
Son of God, Jesus Christ, Christian monotheism 
presented God the Father as eternal begetter of 
the Son, and as totaliter aliter [totally other] 
creator of the world. From the human point of 
view, the doctrine of creation out of nothing 
allows God apophatically to be mysterious in 
God’s own Triune being, and kataphatically to 
be revealed in God’s created world. The 
doctrine of creation was based on four 
judgments of reasoned faith, confirmed by 
reading the scriptures. The first is that God the 
Father is the cause of all reality, both the 
eternally begotten and eternally proceeding 
realities of the second and third divine persons 
and the reality of all that is not God. The second 
is that God as source, that is, as Father, 
eternally “begets” the Son from God’s own 
being, and in turn the Spirit “proceeds” from 
the same source; thus God is triune. A crucial 
distinction was made that “begetting” is not 
“creating” and “creating” is not begetting”. The 
third is that for everything else, the heavens 
and the earth, all things visible and invisible, 
the universe, God is not the source in the 
senses of Neoplatonist emanationism, but 
uniquely the creator. The world was not 
“begotten” by God, but “created” by God out of 
nothing, that is, not from God’s own being nor 
from anything preexisting. The fourth is that 
creation took place at the “beginning.” 
Comparatively, it is my judgment that the 
Christian doctrine of God’s creation of the 
world out of nothing and with a beginning may 
find homologues in Hinduism, but that the 
Christian doctrine of God’s creation of the 
world out of nothing with a beginning is 
singularly distinctive of Christian faith in its 
creedal form. It is not found elsewhere. This is 
an a posteriori judgment that may be disproved 
by a single instance. 
The judgment of creation out of nothing 
requires what has been called the “metaphysics 
of creation.” Robert Sokolowski describes the 
doctrine of creation out of nothing as the basis 
for the “Christian distinction.”  
 
The Christian distinction between God and 
the world is therefore a distinction that is, 
in principle, both most primary and yet 
capable of being obliterated, because one of 
the terms of the distinction, the world, does 
not have to be. To be God, God does not 
need to be distinguished from the world, 
because there does not need to be anything 
other than God alone . . . And the world is 
not diminished in its own excellence, it is 
not somehow slighted because God is not 
related by a real relation to it; rather the 
world is now understood as not having had 
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to be. It did not have to be, it is there out of 
choice. And if the choice was not motivated 
by any need of completion in the one who 
let it be, and not even motivated by the 
need for ‘there’ to be more perfection and 
greatness, then the world is there through 
an incomparable generosity. The world 
exists simply for the glory of God. The glory 
of God is seen not only in particularly 
splendid parts of the world but in the very 
existence of the world and everything in 
it.8 
 
This Christian foundational and definitive 
doctrine, that God created the universe out of 
nothing with a beginning, that is, not out of 
God’s own being nor from anything 
preexisting, has remote homologues, but not 
analogues, within the religious traditions of 
Hinduism. I distinguish here “analogy,” as used 
theologically, from “homology,” as used 
comparatively.9 In a coherent 
Christian/Catholic theology, the “analogy of 
being” is used to justify speech about God with 
language that is neither univocal nor equivocal. 
God has being; created beings have being. The 
word “being” in both cases does not assert the 
same judgment. God and the created being are 
infinitely different. “Being” is therefore 
predicated neither univocally nor equivocally. 
Created beings are not similar to God, nor do 
they add anything to God. Human concepts 
derived from created being can be used of God, 
but only “analogously.”10  
In contrast, homology when used in 
comparative contexts seeks to avoid 
equivocation by describing a similar function in 
a dissimilar system, an asymmetrical 
resemblance of realities otherwise unlike. For 
example, Yahweh and Tao may be judged 
homologous because they are both at the 
center of their different religious traditions. 
They are the central terms of reference, yet in 
other very important respects dissimilar, more 
unlike than like. Perhaps they can in a limping 
way be compared to the wings of a bird and the 
wings of an insect. Both wings enable flight, but 
biologically, structurally, physiologically, and 
chemically, they are very dissimilar. According 
to the judgments of their different religious 
traditions, Yahweh and Tao do not refer to the 
same reality at all once Yahweh is related to 
the judgment that Yahweh is that which 
created the universe out of nothing, not out of 
God’s own being nor out of anything 
preexisting. The Tao is not that. 
The Christian doctrine of creation is not 
easily understood in ordinary language. A 
special theological language emerged in the 
patristic period of the first six Christian 
centuries. It is possible to conceive of God 
without a created world. It is possible to 
conceive of a world without God. The world 
might not have been. If the world does exist by 
creation, if it is “gifted” by God, then the 
response should include gratitude for the 
world’s existence, and wonder at the way it is. 
Theological reasoning about gratitude to the 
Triune God and wonder at the universe leads to 
a theology of human freedom and love for 
God.11  
However, one thing that creation is not is 
that it is not a change. The created universe has 
no material cause. Nothing changes. Thomas 
Aquinas theologically states this emphatically. 
 
Creation is not change, except merely 
according to a mode of understanding. For 
change means that the same something 
should be different now from what it was 
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previously. . . . But in creation, by which 
the whole substance of a thing is produced, 
the same thing can be taken as different 
now and before only according to our way 
of understanding, so that a thing is 
understood first as not existing at all, and 
afterwards as existing. . . . Creation places 
something in the thing created according 
to relation only; because what is created is 
not made by movement or change. . . . 
Hence creation in the creature is only a 
certain relation to the Creator as to the 
principle of its being.12 
 
Aquinas also argued that “in the beginning” 
could not be reasoned to. It requires revelation.  
 
I answer that, by faith alone do we hold, 
and by no demonstration can it be proved, 
that the world did not always exist.13 
 
Thus the great Hindu dialecticians had no 
reason to reason to “beginning.” The conjoined 
creation of the universe by God out of nothing 
and of one that begins may be a “haplax 
legoumena” [one-time teaching] with no 
corresponding Hindu homologue. This 
judgment is tentative.14 
 
III. Additional Complexity 
Contemporary Western philosophical 
tradition was influenced by the Christian 
doctrine and theologies of creation out of 
nothing. Even as it may no longer accept it,15 
philosophy is haunted by the question of why 
there is something rather than nothing. This 
question is not synonymous with the judgment 
of creation out of nothing. As Martin Heidegger 
states, even as he rejects the judgment of 
creation out of nothing:  
 
Why are there ‘existents’ [things that are] 
rather than nothing? That is the question. 
Clearly it is no ordinary question . . . And 
yet each of us is grazed at least once, 
perhaps more than once, by the hidden 
power of this question, even if he is not 
aware of what is happening to him.16 
 
The question remains open, and peculiar, 
whatever way an attempt at an answer it made, 
because it cannot be answered on its own 
terms. For this question there is no 
Archimedean point from which to answer. 
Heidegger’s question works both ways. As Hans 
Urs von Balthasar states: 
 
Why in fact is there something rather than 
nothing? The question remains open 
regardless of whether one affirms or denies 
the existence of an absolute being. If there 
is no absolute being, whatever reason could 
there be that these finite, ephemeral things 
exist in the midst of nothing, things that 
could never add up to the absolute as a 
whole or evolve into it? But, on the other 
hand, if there is an absolute being, and if 
this being is sufficient unto itself, it is 
almost more mysterious why there should 
exist something else.17 
 
A theology comparative of the judgments 
of Christian faith and of judgments of the 
religious traditions of Hinduism must attend 
both to the doctrine of creation out of nothing 
and to the reasoning behind it. Both Christian 
and Hindu theology as they develop will also 
come to be haunted by the question why there 
is anything at all. The last question adds to the 
asymmetries that Patil describes above.  
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A theology that is comparative must also 
take account of the rejection of the creedal 
doctrines and theologies of Christian faith by 
much of the Western philosophical tradition 
since Descartes, a rejection which would 
logically extend to the religious traditions of 
Hinduism as well. For example, John R. Searle 
says: 
 
Given what we know about the details of 
the world---about such things as the 
position of the elements in the periodic 
table, the number of chromosomes in the 
cells of different species, and the nature of 
the chemical bond---this world view is not 
an option. It is not simply up for grabs 
along with a lot of competing world views. 
Our problem is not that somehow we have 
failed to come up with a convincing proof 
of the existence of God or that the 
hypothesis of an afterlife remains in serious 
doubt, it is rather that in our deepest 
reflections we cannot take such opinions 
seriously.18 
 
We will not discuss further the need for 
comparative theology to consider this dismissal 
of Christian and Hindu worldviews, but it 
should be kept in mind. 
 
IV. Reasoning with Śaṁkara about “Whence the 
Janma, Etc. of This” 
Bādarāyana’s Brahma Sūtras is the key text 
for the Hindu traditions known as Vedānta. 
There is a divergence between the monistic and 
theistic traditions of Vedānta ranging through 
ontology, epistemology, and soteriology. 
However, Advaita Vedānta emphatically 
affirmed the perfect being of Brahman, the 
Supreme. Brahman is the ultimate goal of the 
human quest. Brahman is so transcendent that 
it includes all that is finite. This transcendence 
is thus immanent in all that is finite. How this 
could be explained is the cause for the 
divergences among the Vedāntic traditions. 
Selfhood is the primary analogue for 
understanding Brahman. It is the basis for 
whatever relationship there is between 
Brahman and finite selves. The monistic or 
Advaitin tradition of Śaṁkara [first half of the 
eight century CE] asserts that the Supreme Self 
or Brahman is the only ultimate reality, and 
finite empirical existence is unreal from the 
perspective of Brahman. At first, Śaṁkara 
seems to accept Bādarāyana’s assertion that 
Brahman is “that from which the janma, etc. of 
this universe.” However, he goes on to assert 
that judging “one thing to be another” is 
always an error. After the removal of such a 
superimposition, he can deny that there is a 
material cause [pradhānā] of the universe. He 
cites Bādarāyana to show that there is not an 
independent cause of the universe. 
 
[The pradhānā of the Saṁkhyas is] not the 
cause of the universe, because it is not 
mentioned in the Upaniṣads, [which fact is 
clear] from the fact of seeing [thinking].19 
 
This assertion of Bādarāyana as understood by 
Śaṁkara is based on Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.ii.1-
2: 
 
In the beginning, my dear, this world was 
just Being [sat], one only, without a second. 
To be sure, some people say: ‘In the 
beginning this world was just Non-being 
[asat], one only, without a second; from 
that Non-being Being was produced.’ But 
verily, my dear, whence could this be?’ said 
The Asymmetry of ‘Creation’ and ‘Origination’: Contrasts within Comparative Theology 83 
he. ‘How from Non-being could Being be 
produced? On the contrary, my dear, in the 
beginning this world was just Being, one 
only, without a second.20 
 
This concurs with the Christian teaching that 
God did not create the world out of anything 
other than God. This is not, however, creation 
out of nothing because there is no difference 
between cause and effect [satkāryavāda]. For 
Śaṁkara the concepts of cause and effect serve 
a propaedeutic purpose, but, as in the end they 
are considered errors, they are eventually 
superseded by knowledge of the real. There 
really is no “created” or “orginated” universe, 
since the universe is not metaphysically 
different from Brahman.  
This lack of difference is not reciprocal. 
Brahman as cause is identical with its effect in 
the universe, but the effects of the universe are 
not identical with the cause. Thus all effects, 
whatever one makes of their relative reality, 
are ultimately unreal in the face of the 
transcendence of a Brahman understood as 
non-dual. There cannot be a second except as a 
mistake. Brahman so conceived cannot engage 
in creative activity or be creative in act of a 
“created” or an “originated” world. Activity 
involves a change and a lack of permanence 
that are incompatible with Brahman’s 
transcendence. The apparent effects in a 
separate “originated” world are some kind of 
mistake. Brahman is indeed totaliter aliter, 
totally other, from the originated world, but 
the originated world is totaliter non aliter [totally 
not other] to Brahman. For Śaṁkara causality, 
except perhaps as a pure potentiality which 
cannot be actualized, cannot be reconciled with 
the transcendence of Brahman. A pure 
potentiality which cannot be actualized is not a 
potentiality. Thus it is not two, advaita. 
Two additional points can be made here. 
The first is essential to the Hindu religious 
traditions of Vedānta. Janma is always 
associated with, and never separated from, the 
“etc.” These are “sustenance” and “dissolution” 
of the universe. The second point is essential to 
Śaṁkara. These three provide only an 
indicative definition for Brahman, not an 
essential one. They point to the existence of 
Brahman. If one says, “see that man in the 
yellow robe,” the man is known through the 
attribute of the yellow robe. The man is not the 
yellow robe, but the yellow robe follows him 
around. If one says, “bring the man who saw 
the sea,” the man can be brought, but not the 
sea. Thus the “janma, sustenance, and 
dissolution of the universe” are like the yellow 
robed man whom we see because we see the 
yellow robe. At the same time, they are also like 
the man who saw the sea, because when he is 
brought here he does not bring the sea. Neither 
are the yellow robe or the sea essential 
indicators, but they are indicators. This is the 
case with the “janma, sustenance, and 
dissolution of the universe.” When we see 
them, we know Brahman. But when we know 
Brahman, we know that Brahman is not the 
“janma, sustenance, and dissolution of the 
universe.” Certainly, in the tradition of 
Śaṁkara, Brahman does not cause the “janma, 
sustenance, and dissolution of the universe.” 
This means that the reality of processes of the 
universe can be reduced to Brahman, but more 
deeply that the reality of the universe cannot 
be reduced to, or deduced from, the existence 
of Brahman. This has been called a “non-
reciprocal relation of dependence.”21 The 
universe is only real in its cause and is unreal as 
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an effect. In effect, since it is unreal as an 
effect, it really is not caused either. Brahman is 
not two. 
 
IV. Does Madhva Make a Difference? 
Madhva [1238-1317 CE] was the founder of 
the school of Dvaita Vedānta, also known as 
Tattvavāda [lit. teaching of reality].22 His 
teaching is a major point of departure in the 
long-running Vedāntic debate between theism 
and non-dualism. Madhva protests against the 
non-dualism of Śaṁkara. Madhva is sometimes 
mentioned as the Hindu thinker closest to the 
Western monotheistic religions. However, 
Madhva does not teach creation ex nihilo, the 
Christian teaching that God created the world 
out of nothing with a beginning.  
For Madhva, Brahman is God, understood 
and identified by name as Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is the 
primary, personal and divine reality who is 
metaphysically different from the individual 
self and from the plurality of the other beings 
of the universe. Brahman/Viṣṇu is the sole self-
dependent reality. Brahman is not the material 
cause of the universe. The universe is not a 
modification of Brahman. This is the overall 
import of the authoritative Hindu scriptures: 
 
Therefore, as non-difference is 
contradicted by all the sources of 
knowledge, it is not the purport of the 
scriptures. On the contrary, the highest 
meaning of all the scriptures is the 
preeminence of Viṣṇu over every other 
entity.23  
The correct import of the scriptural texts was a 
unique form Hindu monotheism that proposed 
the eternal metaphysical difference between 
God as independent and everything else as 
eternally dependent on God. 
 
The universe has five differences: there is 
the difference between the individual self 
and the Lord. There is the difference 
between the Lord and on-sentient material 
realities. There is the difference between 
the individual selves. There is the 
difference between individual selves and 
non-sentient material realities. There is the 
difference between one non-sentient 
material reality and another. The 
difference between these five is real.24 
 
In the words of Ignatius Puthiadam: 
 
The Supreme Being’s transcendence is not 
expressed by means of the analogy of 
being, but by making Viṣṇu a ‘tattva sui 
generis,’ with certain specific attributes. . . . 
Transcendence, in the final analysis is not 
the total otherness in being, the otherness 
in existence itself, but the fact of being the 
greatest in a hierarchy of existents.25 
 
Thus Madhva’s teaching about Brahman/Viṣṇu 
is only a remote homologue to the Christian 
doctrine God’s creation of the world out of 
nothing. Madhva does not make a difference 
here. 
 
V. Conclusion: A Class of Homologous 
Doctrines: “Creation out of Nothing” and 
“Whence the Origination, Etc. of This” 
If we accept the Christian understanding of 
the terms “creation out of nothing,” then 
Bādarāyana, understood according to Śaṁkara, 
is not speaking about creation at all nor is 
Madhva. The same is true for the Bhāgavata 
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Purāṇa. I mistranslated the opening line from 
the Bhāgavata Purāṇa both according to 
Śrīdhara and according to Madhva. In these 
contexts janma is mistranslated as “creation.” It 
should be “origination, etc.” However, thinkers 
from within the Hindu traditions if they engage 
in comparative theology should be intrigued 
about the Christian doctrine “creation out of 
nothing.” The Christian faith’s judgment of 
“out of nothing’ is tantalizingly close to 
Śaṁkara’s denial that Brahman is a 
metaphysically material cause, but it is quite 
far from Śaṁkara’s denial that the effect 
ultimately exists. His “non-reciprocal relation 
of dependence” of the universe on Brahman 
can be tantalizingly close to the doctrine of 
God’s creation out of nothing, but theologically 
it lacks the giftedness of a real gift of reality to 
the universe. Origination is not creation. 
In the Christian reasoning about creation, 
there is a further element that is added to “out 
of nothing,” and that is “with a beginning.” The 
Christian doctrine is incomplete without “with 
a beginning.” Therefore, I conclude, although 
tentatively, that the Christian doctrine of the 
creation of the universe by God out of nothing, 
but with a beginning, is close to being a “haplax 
legoumena” [one-time teaching] with no 
corresponding, or even near, homologue within 
Hinduism.26 Nonetheless, like its Advaita and 
Dvaita Vedānta relatives of several removes, 
the Christian teaching on God’s creation of the 
world out of nothing with a beginning is 
dependent on revelation from God, not on 
reasoning alone. So too are the conclusions of 
Advaita about the non-duality of Brahman and 
all that appears to exist; and also the 
conclusions of Dvaita that Brahman is different 
from everything else  and that everything else 
is real and not just appearance. 
At this point in the ever deeper probing of 
an asymmetrical comparative theology, it is no 
longer correct to translate  janma in the context 
of Advaita or Dvaita Vedānta as “creation.” 
“Origination, etc.” is to be preferred. “Creation” 
is a category mistake since “creation out of 
nothing” and “whence the origination, etc. of 
this [universe]” represent two contrasting 
instances of a loosely gathered comparative 
class of homologous doctrines. They are a class 
of remotely homologous doctrines about the 
relation of the transcendent and the finite, 
which again are differently defined by each 
religious tradition. It may be the case, pace 
Clooney, that close reading and reasoning is 
building up, rather breaking down, a boundary 
between Christianity and Hinduism, albeit 
asymmetrically. We are still early in the 
development of comparative theology whether 
in its generic, or Christian, or Hindu forms. In 
its Christian development, it is even more 
premature to presume that appropriate 
categories have yet been found that can do 
justice to the differences among the religious 
traditions. In the case investigated here, the 
comparison of “creation out of nothing” and 
“whence, the origination, etc. of this universe” 
requires more work. In the words of Francis 
Clooney: 
 
One also has to know what to do with these 
similarities and differences once they are 
identified, how to decide which ones 
matter more, and how to determine which 
are the significant questions raised by 
them. Making sense of similarities and 
differences is not a pretheological sorting 
of details but a theological enterprise that 
must be undertaken meticulously and with 
respect for the complexities of theological 
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judgments. What is most interesting and 
important eludes a reductive approach that 
appreciates only one’s theology and 
respects no other view as true theology.27 
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